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By the year of 1864, the North and South had been at war for roughly three years. A year 
previously, the Confederacy experienced a great military defeat at Gettysburg; a battle that many 
believe represented the South’s last chance for victory and secession. However, there was still a 
chance of a negotiated independence for the Confederacy. The South’s chance lay in making the 
war too tiring and costly for the Northern public to accept. 1864 was also a presidential election 
year, and if the Confederacy had not been so spectacularly defeated on the battlefield during the 
election, there is a chance that President Abraham Lincoln would have lost his bid for reelection 
to the Democratic hopeful, George B. McClellan. Had he won, the outcome of the Civil War 
would likely have been very different. However, McClellan did not win, and Lincoln became the 
President, ensuring the North’s continued commitment to the war. This course of events in 1864 
is an example of historian James McPherson’s contingency theory, which asserts that the 
Union’s Civil War victory was not pre-determined, and instead it was contingent on the outcome 
of key event that could have went the other way and led to a Confederate victory. This paper will 
argue that the outcome of the Civil War hinged, not on the well-known numerical superiority of 
the North, but rather on the avoidable failures of Confederate leadership, which led to massive 
battlefield defeats in 1864.  
The North did have superior manpower and resources. The North had a greater 
population, larger industrial capacity, and better logistical systems than the South did. They had 
a better navy that they were able to blockade and corner the South, and the North had the better 
diplomatic game with overseas nations. Finally, the North was more united than the South; many 
areas in the South were Unionist, most notably the area of West Virginia and this has led many 
to argue that the North simply overwhelmed the Confederate forces. This explanation originated 
first from the defeated Confederate soldiers themselves. Robert E. Lee’s speech at Appomattox 
implies this with his remarks about how “The Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to 
yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.”1 Similarly, when asked about the Confederate 
defeat, a Confederate soldier replied that, “they never whipped us, Sir, unless they were four to 
one. If we had anything like a fair chance or less disparity of numbers, we should have won our 
cause and established our independence.”2 Later generations continued to point to the Union’s 
undeniably superior resources as the primary cause of their victory.  Historian Richard Current 
stated that “God was on the side of the heaviest battalions,”3 while Shelby Foote in Ken Burns’s 
Civil War documentary noted that “the North fought with one hand behinds its back: and that the 
South never had a chance at all.4  
Other historians, however, have challenged the assertion that the North’s victory was 
inevitable.  In particular, James McPherson’s posited “contingency theory,” which argues that 
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the South had many chances for victory at various points during the war.5 Historians like Gabor 
S. Boritt and Gary Ecelbarger have supported McPherson’s theory, with Ecelbarger citing the 
conflict for Atlanta as being a critical turning phase in the war. 6 Others like Reid Mitchell, 
accept the contingency theory, but also acknowledge that the Union had the odds stacked in their 
favor due to their superior resources.7 Whereas, Albert Castel explicitly rejects the idea that 
superior numbers and logistics guaranteed Northern victory.8 
Of all the potential outcomes during the war, McPherson’s argument that the events of 
1864 and Lincoln’s resulting reelection represented both the last and best chance for Confederate 
victory is the strongest. 9 By 1864 there was a peace faction movement in the North that sought 
to achieve a negotiated peace with the South. On varied fronts, the Union forces seemed stalled, 
and with no foreseeable end in sight to the war. After three years, the carnage of war had taken 
its toll on many on both sides. There was a real danger that the Northern public would grow tired 
of the war and elect another President to push forth a negotiated peace settlement. The North’s 
advantages were only relevant to the victory if they had the willpower and competence to utilize 
them properly. and if the Northern public had realized that they had effectively won by the fall of 
1864.   
 Abraham Lincoln’s reelection was uncertain. If he did not win, then the war may have 
ended in a negotiated peace settlement. Lincoln faced a popular opponent, former Union General 
George B. McClellan. McClellan was charismatic, determined and an easy candidate for the 
Democrats to rally behind. Lincoln’s potential defeat at the hands of McClellan was contingent 
on the outcome of two events on the battlfields in 1864.One was the Confederate government’s 
decision to replace General Joseph E. Johnston with General John Bell Hood in Georgia. The 
change in leadership prompted a foolish assault that decimated the Confederate forces in Georgia 
and allowed General William Tecumseh Sherman to take Atlanta and win a smashing victory for 
the Union forces. The other event that impacted the election was General Philip Sheridan’s 
campaign in the Shenandoah Valley and his defeat of the Confederate forces led by Jubal Early. 
These two great battles were key victories for the Northern war effort. They raised Northern 
morale and convinced the people that victory was very much possible.10 The war continued for 
several more months, but these two events played a pivotal role in deciding the outcome.  
However, in the years leading up to 1864 there was a possibility for the Confederates to 
gain the upper hand. In the eastern theater, the Army of the Potomac was plagued by a series of 
ineffectual or timid commanders who could not utilize their resources effectively to defeat the 
Confederacy. Lincoln was frustrated with his commanders until he was able to find the generals 
he was looking for that could achieve victory with ruthless drive. He found those generals in 
Ulysses Grant and William Sherman who quickly made his Civil War victory dreams a reality.11 
By late 1864, the South had lost the will to fight as the North pushed forward. Apart from the 
morale boost brought by these victories, they had the very real strategic and tactical effects of 
shutting down Southern supply lines and dealing immense damage to Southern infrastructure, 
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especially in the fertile granaries of the Shenandoah Valley. The South was defeated, and the 
North won the military portion of the Civil War.  
To understand why 1864 presented the last chance for a Confederate victory, one must 
look at the military and political situation of the events leading up to 1864. The North and the 
South had engaged in military warfare for three years now. The South tended to dominate in the 
Eastern part of the war while the North dominated in the Western and home fronts of the war. In 
political and military terms, the South had some chances for independence. Given the North’s 
inherent advantages in manpower and logistics, the most optimal of all those chances relied on 
the North not choosing to go to war at all. If the North had realized these advantages, then they 
could gradually grind down and crush the South.12 
Early in the war certain individuals like Winfield S. Scott realized this and drew up the 
Anaconda plan to crush the South. This plan would become the bedrock of Northern victory. By 
contrast, the South adopted a more reactive strategy, of waiting on the defensive to repel the 
Northern invaders and hold out until they gained sovereign recognition of their new state. The 
North would play the role of the attacker and the South that of the defender. It was a dynamic 
that held true save for a handful of instances such as Lee’s two invasions of the North in 1862 
and later in 1863, both with the intent of gaining European recognition of the Confederacy in 
what they hoped would be a ‘’Southern Saratoga,” In both aspects, Lee failed to achieve that sort 
of great victory, and indeed he avoided destruction narrowly.13 
The year of 1864 saw the long-awaited clash between the two leading generals of both 
sides, Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant. Each had won a series of victories for their respective 
sides and both here highly regarded by the Presidents of their nations. It proved to be a great 
clash in the East. Lee had won victories against the Union army in the East before, and Grant had 
cut his teeth in carving up Confederate territories in the Western theater. By 1864, Lincoln had 
called Grant to command the Army of the Potomac and thus set the stage for the finale of the 
war. While Lee had won bold and stunning victories against previous Union generals, his 
victories were as much his tactical skill as his opponent’s hesitation and incompetence. Most of 
his previous Union opponents were not inspiring men. That would change when he fought Grant 
who possessed both the skill and more importantly the willpower to achieve victory.  
Grant’s conduct of the war in the East was different than that of the previous generals and 
contributed to the South’s loss. Previously the armies retired after great set-piece battles to give 
the soldiers time and rest to recuperate for the next battle. Grant pursued total warfare and 
continuous attrition warfare against Lee. It had the effect of whittling down the numbers of Lee’s 
army in continuous attrition warfare. The Confederate army steadily disintegrated because it 
could not absorb the kinds of losses it was sustaining from the battles with Grant. Eventually, the 
Confederate army was forced into the bloody siege of Petersburg where the first instances of 
trench warfare appeared to observers. This siege warfare strategy allowed the Confederacy to 
hold off the Union forces for the nine months they fought there until Grant extended the lines so 
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much that Lee was forced to retreat. This series of battles concluded in Lee’s famous surrender at 
Appomattox.14 
While Grant pinned down Lee in Virginia, he had capable subordinates who won battles 
that the North needed to achieve that victory on the home front. The victories in the other 
theaters provided the needed impetus for Lincoln to win a second term.  Grant issued orders for 
General Philip Sheridan to take care of the Shenandoah Valley and end the Confederate control 
of that area. He also issued orders for General Sherman to go through Georgia and split the South 
in half. Both campaigns had great consequences. According to Grant “It was followed later by 
Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley; and these two campaigns probably had more 
effect in settling the election of the following November than all the speeches, all the bonfires, 
and all the parading with banners and bands of music in the North.”15 The two conflicts were the 
last chance for the South to achieve a negotiated peace. They were unable to avoid the outcome 
and thus could not secure their independence.16 
In Georgia, the Union advance was commanded by William T. Sherman, one of the 
generals Grant promoted and charged with defeating the Confederates in the state. He initiated a 
strategy of total war in order to destroy the Southern war industry. Opposing him was General 
Joseph E. Johnston, a skilled and cautious general who stymied Sherman’s advance into Atlanta. 
This defensive strategy worked well for the Confederacy because of technological advances in 
weaponry during the Civil War; firepower had become more lethal and advanced. Much of this 
had been proven on Civil War battlefields like Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, Cold Harbor and 
other destructive direct assaults that fared poorly in the attack.17 
 In response to criticisms from Jefferson Davis, Johnston summarized the strategic 
situation in Georgia, concluding, “Therefore, a victory gained by us could not have been 
decisive, while defeat would have been utterly disastrous.”18 The risks of a defeat outweighed the 
rewards of a victory. Rather the victory for the Confederacy in 1864 relied on simply holding out 
long enough. Johnston preserved the lives of his men and refused to give Sherman the kind of 
grand setpiece battle that would allow the Union forces to bring their logistical advantages to 
bear against him. 
Even Johnston’s opponents agreed that he was making the correct tactical decisions. 
Grant himself wrote in his memoirs, “For the most part I think Johnston was correct” explicitly 
noting that Johnston might have been able to delay Sherman’s advance by a year to the point 
where the North might have gotten tired of the conflict.19 General Sherman, Johnston’s opponent 
in that campaign, also agreed that Johnston had made the correct decisions, stating that his tactics 
were “cautious but prudent.”20 Johnston’s tactics would preserve his army and effectively stymie 
Sherman’s advance into Georgia. The one frontal assault that Sherman did execute at Kennesaw 
Mountain ended in a bloody repulse of Northern forces who suffered heavy losses.21 
Johnston’s cautious tactics eventually got him replaced. Despite his sound and prudent 
generalship, he had a terrible relationship with Confederate President Jefferson Davis.22 The two 
men did not get along very well. Davis was also notorious for interfering in the military 
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commands of his generals.23 These faults were combined with his frustration at Johnston’s 
defensive tactics. He replaced Joseph E. Johnston with a general named John Bell Hood, who 
had served with the army of Northern Virginia. John Bell Hood brought a much more direct and 
aggressive command structure to the army in Georgia that ended with its destruction. Hood 
proceeded to leave Johnston’s fortifications in Atlanta and run his army into the ground through 
a series of frontal assaults. The Army of the Tennessee simply disintegrated in a series of costly 
attacks on the prepared Union defenses. Even after Sherman moved on, General Hood continued 
to run his army into the ground by attacking Nashville and Franklin.24 
The change in command was greatly benfited Sherman in Georgia. He asked his officers, 
some of whom knew Hood from the prewar days, what kind of man he was. Sherman learned 
that Hood was a brave and reckless fighter, but not as intelligent or reserved as Johnston.25 
Sherman was faced with a different kind of opponent from Hood, an aggressive one that finally 
gave Sherman the fight he was looking for. He was able to force the Confederate army into a 
series of battles that would whittle them down due to attrition and destroy them, which allowed 
Sherman to take Atlanta and move through Georgia and into South Carolina.26 
Northern reaction to the fall of Atlanta was filled with delight. Harper’s Weekly 
celebrated the news with joy noting that ”There is not a man who did not feel that McClellan’s 
chances were diminished by the glad tidings from Atlanta; nor any one who does not know that 
if Sherman had been defeated, the friends of the Chicago candidate would have felt surer of his 
success.”27 General Sherman himself noted in his memoirs of the fortunate timing of the victory, 
stating that “This victory was most opportune; Mr. Lincoln himself told me afterward that even 
he had previously felt in doubt, for the summer was fast passing away; that General Grant 
seemed to be checkmated about Richmond and Petersburg, and my army seemed to have run up 
against an impassable barrier, when, suddenly and unexpectedly, came the news that "Atlanta 
was ours, and fairly won." It was welcome news for the Union.28  
By contrast, the mood of the Confederacy to the fall of Atlanta, demonstrated the other 
side of the contingency theory. The loss was a blow to Southern morale on home front. Mary 
Bodkin Chestnut wrote with lamentation that Atlanta had fallen, and the Confederate Army faced 
misfortune, saying that “These stories of our defeats in the valley fall like blows upon a dead 
body. Since Atlanta fell I have felt as if all were dead within me forever. Captain Ogden, of 
General Chesnut's staff, dined here to-day. Had ever brigadier, with little or no brigade, so 
magnificent a staff? The reserves, as somebody said, have been secured only by robbing the 
cradle and the grave-the men too old, the boys too young. Isaac Hayne, Edward Barnwell, 
Bacon, Ogden, Richardson, Miles are the picked men of the agreeable world.”29 The citizens of 
the Confederacy lost their will to continue fighting the war.  
In his memoirs, Johnston himself recognized the vital nature of taking Atlanta noting that 
“The importance to the Confederacy of defeating the enterprise against Atlanta was not to be 
measured by military consequences alone. Political considerations were also involved, and added 
much to the interest of that campaign.”30 This provided the Confederacy with the breathing room 
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they needed on the negotiating table as Johnston further notes: “If Sherman had been foiled, 
these teachings would have caused great exaggeration of the consequences of his failure, which 
would have strengthened the peace party greatly; so much, perhaps, as to have enabled it to carry 
the presidential election, which would have brought the war to an immediate close.” 31 
Unfortunately, his opponents recognized this as well. 
Sherman was able to do this only because of Johnston’s removal and his replacement 
with John Bell Hood. Hood sent his army against the Union forces, leaving Georgia open to 
Sherman’s advances. The reason for this mistake is due to the flaws of Confederate President 
Jefferson Davis, who interfered too much and played favorites with his generals. At first glance 
Davis might appear to have the excellent qualifications for a wartime commander, since he 
served as secretary of war for Franklin Pierce. Unfortunately, his flaw of micromanaging and 
playing favorites would be his undoing.32 It was because of Davis’s choice that the defensive-
minded commander that the South needed in Georgia, was replaced Hood who was not suited for 
the task at hand. 
The North’s Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1864 led to another decisive military 
victory that convinced the home front that victory was near. The campaign was ordered by 
General Grant to clear out the Shenandoah Valley of Confederate forces. It was a fertile area that 
supplied Confederate army with food and resources. In the words of General Grant “The 
Shenandoah Valley was very important to the Confederates because it was the principal 
storehouse they now had for feeding their armies about Richmond. It was well known that they 
would make a desperate struggle to maintain it.”33 Burning and destroying the valley’s resources 
would be a prudent strategic move to weaken the Confederate armies and increase Northern 
fortunes in Virginia. 
Grant put General Philip Sheridan in charge, a daring young cavalry officer who made it 
his mission to destroy the Confederate forces in the valley. According to his own memoirs 
“General Grant had not only decided to retain in the Shenandoah Valley a large force sufficient 
to defeat [General Jubal] Early's army or drive it back to Lee, but he had furthermore determined 
to make that sections by the destruction of its supplies, untenable for continued occupancy by the 
Confederates. This cut off one of Lee's mainstays in the way of sustenance, and at the same time 
diminish the number of recruits and conscripts he received.”34 Sheridan would face Confederate 
forces under the leadership of Early, one of Lee’s officers. There would be some battles and 
clashes until Sheridan made great successes at the battles of Fisher Hill and Cedar Creek that saw 
the Confederate forces smashed in battle. Both of these battles were great propaganda victories 
for the Union. Over the course of the campaign, Sheridan followed the example of General 
Sherman and proceeded to destroy as much as he could of the farms and mills in the Shenandoah 
region to deny it as a place of operation for future Confederate forces. It was an excellent 
example of contingency, with both obtaining a political victory for Lincoln and achieving a 
strategic goal at the same time.35 
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The Shenandoah Valley campaign unquestionably affected the election of 1864. 
According to Sheridan’s memoirs “the authorities at Washington having impressed upon me that 
the defeat of my army might be followed by the overthrow of the party in power, which event, it 
was believed, would at least retard the progress of the war, if, indeed, it did not lead to the 
complete abandonment of all coercive measures.”36 Sheridan’s victory at Cedar Creek was said 
to have averted a “national disaster” due to the upcoming nature of the elections.37 General Grant 
himself noted that “I had reason to believe that the administration was a little afraid to have a 
decisive battle at that time, for fear it might go against us and have a bad effect on the November 
elections. The convention which had met and made its nomination of the Democratic candidate 
for the presidency had declared the war a failure.” In this case, the North won that decisive 
victory.38 
For the election of 1864, it was between the “National Union” led by Lincoln, which was 
the Republican Party with some pro-War Democrats added to the mix. They were opposed by the 
Democratic Party, most notably the anti-war faction among the Democrats, who were derisively 
called “copperheads” by their detractors. The Democratic Party had nominated George 
McClellan. A proud and charismatic man, he had served as a successful railroad president before 
the war and was effectively the army’s golden boy in the immediate prewar years. However, he 
was too timid as a soldier. After he wasdismissed by Lincoln, McClellan would reappear as the 
Democratic candidate for victory, railing against Lincoln’s continuation of the war. As things 
stood at the latter half of 1864, he had a good chance of victory. McClellan and Lincoln had not 
gotten along in their previous years. Lincoln saw McClellan as being too cautious and 
ineffectual. McClellan had nothing but disdain for Lincoln, referring to him in derogatory terms. 
While McClellan himself was pro-war and favored the Union, the Democratic Party as a whole 
pushed forth a platform for peace. It was likely that a Northern victory with McClellan in 
command, may have led to a more generous peace settlement for the Confederacy. Due to the 
great Union military victory at Atlanta in 1864, Lincoln was able to rally the popular support that 
he needed to carry the election successfully. Lincoln won over seventy percent of the electoral 
vote.  This is the contingency theory that had Lincoln not won that election due to the Northern 
military successes on the battlefield; then the Confederacy would have a peace settlement.39 
The summer of 1864 was a decisive moment in Civil War history. Military success on the 
battlefield led to political success at the home front. It helped to ensure the reelection of 
President Abraham Lincoln and the successful conclusion of the war. These events are centered 
on the theory of contingency, that the South had opportunities to win a psychological victory 
over the North. Contingency theory in the summer of 1864 hinged largely on two campaigns, the 
Battle for Atlanta and the Shenandoah Valley campaign. The fall of Atlanta was caused by the 
removal of General Joseph E. Johnston whose replacement John Bell Hood, destroyed his army 
in an unwise series of reckless assaults. Because of these two campaigns, the Northern victory in 
the following year was assured, and the South lost their will to fight. 
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